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Abstract 
Climate change is expected to contribute to the migration of tens of millions of people in the coming 
decades. While some migration will be caused by sudden-onset events, such as floods, the majority 
will be due to the long-term impact of climate change on livelihoods. Agrarian countries are 
particularly vulnerable to this climate change impact as the majority of their people depend on 
environmental resources and vulnerable ecosystems for their livelihoods.   
This study explores the complex nexus between climate change, agriculture and international 
migration in East Africa, with a focus on the youth perspective. We provide an extensive review of 
the empirical literature on the climate-migration link. Based on regional climate modeling, we also 
show the trends of climate extremes for East Africa and provide climate projections for the coming 
decades. Our study also examines the quantitative relationship between climate variables and 
migration stock for case study countries.  
Results from our climate model show that the East African region will experience longer and more 
frequent droughts than those associated with the current climate, suggesting that agricultural 
livelihoods in East Africa will become more vulnerable in the coming decades. The region 
experienced significant growth in outmigration in the past few decades and climate change is likely 
to accelerate this migration trend. Our quantitative analysis provides suggestive evidence to support 
this hypothesis. The analysis shows that a higher number of average dry days for a country is 
positively correlated with higher stock of emigrants from that country. 
The prospect of youth international migration from East Africa is high and likely to increase with 
climate change. East Africa’s youth population is not only the highest in the continent, but is more 
likely to be unemployed, less encumbered with family responsibilities and have more education than 
the previous generation. All of these factors support the likelihood of higher youth migration in the 
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Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1°C of global warming above pre-
industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C (IPCC 2018). According to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), while climate models project robust 
differences at various levels of confidence in regional climate characteristics, there is an 
overwhelming agreement that, if warming continues to increase at the current rate, global warming 
is likely to reach 1.5°C, if not beyond, between 2030 and 2052 (IPCC 2018). Among many other 
potential impacts, it is estimated that, globally, an average warming of 1.5°C or beyond raises a 
number of  risks, including heatwaves, heavy rainfall events, crop productivity decline, reduction in 
water availability, undernutrition and habitat loss (IPCC 2018).  
One of the expected consequences of these massive changes in the climate is an unprecedented 
level of human migration. Climate change is anticipated to influence human mobility in all regions of 
the world - although the specific types of impact and magnitude depend on both biophysical and 
socio-economic factors (Piguet and Laczko 2013, IPCC 2014a). Existing evidence shows that climate-
induced migration is already taking place across the world, (Foresight 2011, Ionesco et al. 2016, 
Rigaud et al. 2018) making it imperative to learn more about and plan for this migration. Unplanned, 
large-scale migration at breaking point for the affected communities creates humanitarian crises, 
logistical complications (Foresight 2011) and, potentially, political crises, especially if most of the 
migrants are working-age youth. 
Climate change will hit poor countries and communities relatively harder due to their limited coping 
and adaptive capacity across sectors and the reliance on environmental resources and vulnerable 
ecosystems as a source of livelihoods in poor countries (WRR 2017). At a household and individual 
level, poor people might be heavily affected by climate change even when impacts on the rest of the 
population are limited (IPCC 2018). Regions that are dry are expected to become dryer and 
experience extreme heat events more frequently, (Trenberth et al. 2014) impacting livelihoods of the 
resource-poor population living in these coutriers.  
Most of the world’s poor live in agriculture-dependent countries in Africa and Asia, and climate 
change is expected to have strong negative effect on agriculture (Ray et al. 2019). While extreme 
weather events such as floods, cyclones and drought are visually striking, the long-term, negative 
effects on production, productivity and risk exposure may be more damaging for agriculture-
dependent countries and communities. For example, farmers’ access to agricultural land could 
decline due to landslides, land degradation, flooding or salination. At the same time, deterioration in 
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the quality and availability of forests, water and other ecosystems could result in decreased farm 
productivity, fishing and other related activities – impacting food security. 
The increased risk of climate change contributes to large scale migration by exacerbating existing 
migration drivers. This requires a concerted effort among countries to minimize unplanned 
displacements and to facilitate safe and orderly migration. Recent international conventions and 
agreements recognize and reflect this need for international cooperation and coordination. For 
example, following the request from the 2015 Paris Agreement, the Executive Committee of the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts 
established a task force that can develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, 
minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change. The 2016 New 
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNHCR 2018) also highlights the importance of a 
coordinated response. The declaration emphasizes that large movements of refugees and migrants 
have political, economic and social consequences that cross all borders, demanding global 
approaches and solutions (UN 2016). Similarly, the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
calls for member countries to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility 
of people, including the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. This study 
aims to contribute evidence for the need to translate these intiatives into effective policies. The 
study assesses the nexus among climate change, agriculture and international migration in eastern 
Africa. While the link between environmental shocks and internal migration in Africa has been 
relatively well researched, (Gray and Mueller 2012, Kubik and Maurel 2016, Mastrorillo et al. 2016) 
there is not much work on the impact of climate change on international migration. This study will 
help to fill this gap. 
Agriculture is the main source of livelihoods in Africa, including in East Africa (WB 2019). Across the 
continent, the sector contributes around 60 percent of jobs and about 25 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) (African Development Bank 2016). There is sufficient evidence to suggest that African 
ecosystems are already being affected by climate change, that these changes will grow worse in the 
future, and that the agricultural system is becoming more vulnerable over time (IPCC 2014b).  
Even though most African countries depend on rain-fed agriculture, and as such are vulnerable to 
climate impacts, the region has not attracted as much research as other vulnerable regions. For 
example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014c) highlighted that current 
climate adaptation knowledge in this region relies heavily on case studies. Similarly, there is a 
considerable amount of uncertainty in climate projections for East Africa. This is partly due to the 
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coarse resolution of global climate models which do not reliably capture local processes and 
features, such as the complex topography of the region (Yang et al. 2015, Rigaud et al. 2018).  
This study contributes to filling these gaps by studying the complex nexus between climate change, 
agriculture and international migration in East Africa. The study provides an extensive review of the 
existing literature on the climate-migration link and a conceptual framework that shows the different 
channels through which climate change can lead to migration in East Africa. The study employs 
regional climate models to show trends of climate extremes, such as drought, in East Africa and 
provides climate projections in the coming decades. Using combined climate model estimates for dry 
days and migration data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UNDESA) (UNDESA 2017a), the study also quantitatively analyzes the relationship between climate 
change and migration in East Africa. As this study is especially interested in the youth dimension, it 
















Scope and limitation of the study 
The study covers eight East African countries, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. As the focus of the study is on international migration, the data 
used in the quantitative analysis is based on stock of international migrants from these eight 
countries as reported by UNDESA (2017a). In this study, we define youth as those between the ages 
of 15-34, as suggested by the African Youth Charter (AU 2006). 
The main limitation of this study is availability of age-disaggregated data. Most of the studied 
countries do not have national-level international migration data for use in this analysis. While the 
UNDESA data provides uniformly measured international migration data for all the case study 
countries, the data have three basic weaknesses that limit the level of quantitative analysis that can 
be conducted: i) given that the data collection is based on stock of legally registered migrants in the 
destination countries, it misses irregular migrants, ii) it is not disaggregated by age, hence separate 
youth international migration figures are missing, and iii) while the data covers 27 years (1990-2017), 
it is reported in a five year gap. With only eight countries in the sample, this low frequency data 
means our quantitative analysis is limited by the relatively low sample size. 
The study uses regional climate modelling that performs better than the global model in simulating 
key processes relevant for regional extremes. However, given the limited scope of the study, the 
analysis did not disaggregate within the country. The climate variables in the drought analysis are 
averaged at the country level rather than over specific drought prone areas or hotspots of the 
country. Similarly, the climate analysis was based on annual data instead of crop growing seasons. 
Despite these limitations, it is expected that the climate trends and forecasts from the regional 









Climate change – migration link: Conceptual framework  
The problem of establishing causality 
Migration is a growing and complex global phenomenon. Although there is a consensus among 
researchers that climate change is expected to significantly influence human mobility, (Foresight 
2011) empirically documenting the link between climate change and migration is not 
straightforward. For example, the widely cited projections on ‘climate refugees’ (Myers and Kent 
1995) is challenged by many researchers because it suggests that all those vulnerable to climate 
change, including youth, will migrate, which is not necessarily the case (Foresight 2011). In addition 
to climate, a multitude of factors influence migration decisions including personal, political, 
economic and environmental conditions. The complexity of migration decision-making as a whole 
and the difficulties of causally linking climate change with specific migration decisions is 
acknowledged and extensively debated in the literature (Tacoli 2009, Warner et al. 2010, Black et al. 
2011, Foresight 2011, Maystadt and Mueller 2012, Nicholson 2014, Bettini 2017, Sudmeier-Rieux et 
al. 2017). Recent work on the topic provides a more useful framing of the climate change and 
migration relationship which focuses on how climate change influences the already acknowledged 
drivers of migration (Foresight 2011, Rigaud et al. 2018).  
Conceptual framework: Climate change, agriculture and migration 
The obvious link between climate change and migration is 
through displacement caused by extreme weather events, 
such as cyclones, hurricanes, drought, etc. Climate change, 
however, also interacts with other drivers of migration, 
mainly social, economic, political, environmental and 
demographic (Perch-Nielsen et al. 2008, Warner et al. 
2010, Black et al. 2011, Foresight 2011, Rigaud et al. 2018). 
These interactions will create an even stronger migration 
pressure, although the link may not always be obvious. For example, climate change may accelerate 
political migration due to an increase in conflict caused by resource competition among individuals 
and groups (Foresight 2011). Considering these indirect interactions, this study proposes a 
conceptual framework that discusses the main channels through which climate change could trigger 
migration for agriculture-dependent countries and communities (see Table 1 for major links and 
references that show empirical evidence for each of the links described).  
For farm households, the main effect will be climate change’s effect on agricultural productivity and 
agricultural risk that could impact food security. Climate change is expected to increase landslides, 
Climate change, in addition to 
causing displacement from 
extreme weather events, 
interacts with social, economic, 
political, environmental and 
demographic drivers to create 




land degradation, salination and a reduction in the quality and availability of complementary natural 
resources such as forests, water and other ecosystems. These changes will diminish the size, 
suitability and productivity of farmland that is the basis for agricultural livelihoods, eventually 
pushing farmers and the youth to migrate. For example, a study from Nepal shows that migration 
increases with perceived decline in land productivity and vegetation cover (Massey et al. 2010).  
Climate change is also expected to increase rainfall variability and causes frequent episodes of 
extreme weather events, such as drought or floods. This will increase production risk and the 
livelihood vulnerability, eventually leading to more migration. Large panel data studies from 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Latin America suggest that an increase in temperature and rainfall variability 
influences long-term migration patterns more than natural disasters (Bohra-Mishra et al. 2014, 
Mueller et al. 2014, Thiede et al. 2016). Extensive empirical evidence on agricultural livelihoods 
shows that migration is one of the most common adaptation responses to environmental shocks and 
the reduction of agricultural income. For example, a study assessing the effects of drought on 
population mobility in Ethiopia shows that land-poor households, especially youth, are the most 
vulnerable to this climate extreme (Gray and Mueller 2012). As climate change is expected to create 
more environmental shocks in the coming decades, we are likely to see increased migration. 
The effects of climate change on agricultural production and productivity is not limited to farmers in 
rural communities. What happens in the agricultural sector will also have significant effects on non-
farm households through local and urban labor markets, as well as its effect on the national 
economy. For example, a decline in production and productivity of agricultural activities will push 
more farmers, especially young farmers, away from farming into non-farm wage employment. This 
move will eventually lead to international migration as the increased labor supply depresses wages 
for unskilled labor (Maurel and Tuccio 2016). A slowdown in the agricultural sector in these 
agriculturally-dependent economies will also result in slower economic growth and, overall, fewer 
economic opportunities because of the linkage between agriculture and the rest of the economy 
(Dell et al. 2012). 
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Table 1. Impact of climate change on agricultural livelihood and its potential effect on youth migration. 
Channel of 
influence 
Climate change Impact on agricultural 
livelihoods 
Expected indirect impact 
on youth migration 
Empirical evidences showing 
migration link (examples) 
Farmland Decrease in availability of suitable farmland 
due to landslides, degradation, flooding, 




Increased migration Massey et al. (2010) 
Ecosystem Deterioration in the quality and availability 
of natural resources, including forests, 
water and other productive ecosystems, 





Increased migration Massey et al. (2010), Wrathall and 
Suckall (2016)  
Production 
risk 
Increase in rainfall and temperature 
variability and frequent, extreme events.  
Increased production 
risk 
Increased migration Gray and Mueller, (2012), Bohra-




Rural wages are reduced as many farmers 
resort to hiring out their labor due to a 
decline in their crop productivity. Pressure 
to migrate to urban areas increases. In 
addition, as food prices increase due to 
productivity decline, real wages decline. 
Decline in nominal and 
real wage 




Repeated extreme weather events and 
ecosystem deterioration negatively 
influences economic growth and reduces 
opportunity for citizens. 
Reduced employment 
and income earning 
opportunity 
Increased migration Dell, Jones and Olken (2012) 
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Empirical literature on climate-induced migration 
The scale of the problem 
Assigning specific numbers to the magnitude of climate migration is controversial. The estimated 
‘climate migrant’ or ‘climate refugee’ projections cited in various papers and reports, including the 
influential Stern Report (STERN 2007) and Human Impact Report (GHF 2009) are criticized as speculative 
and methodologically unsound (Black et al. 2011, Foresight 2011, Gemenne 2011, Jakobeit and 
Methmann 2012, Bettini 2017). Many of these projections also build-on or refer to a single publication 
from 1995 (Myers and Kent 1995) that is itself criticized for methodological weakness (Foresight 2011).  
As previously discussed, the main challenge in assigning a specific number to climate migrants arises 
from the fact that migration has many drivers. While displacements caused by extreme weather events 
are easier to account for and attribute, such displacements account for only a small share of migration. 
Despite this, due to the short- and long-term effects of climate change, the scales provide some 
suggestive evidence for the linkage between climate change and migration. For example, in 2017 alone, 
about 19 million people were displaced by sudden-onset disasters within their own country, and 
between 2008 and 2016 an estimated 228 million people were displaced by disasters (IOM 2018). This 
does not include cross-border migration for which data is not available (IOM 2018). Although many 
disaster-related displacements are presumed to be temporary and internal, there is increasingly more 
evidence to suggest that, for individuals and communities that are economically and socially vulnerable, 
the temporary displacement due to climate-related risks can easily turn to permanent migration (IPCC 
2014c). Moreover, as discussed above, climate change will trigger more and longer-term migration 







Climate change and international migration 
Internal versus external migration 
Most climate migration in developing countries is expected to be movement within the same country, 
often from rural to urban areas (Rigaud et al. 2018). This is partly because the effect of environmental 
changes is stronger and more direct on agricultural activities, which are typically located in rural areas 
(Marchiori et al. 2012). Massive internal migration poses a significant challenge for any country, but it 
can be especially demanding for developing countries that often suffer from poor infrastructure, weak 
institutions and binding financial constraints. It is likely that such displacements spill into neighboring 
countries and could create transboundary problems involving young climate migrants. Moreover, 
national and international migration is essentially interlinked. A rapid increase in internal youth 
migration, especially from rural to urban areas, is likely to increase the level of international youth 
migration due to pressure on the urban wage (Marchiori et al. 2012).  
Empirical literature on the impact of climate change on international 
migration 
The impact of climate change on international migration is not well researched, especially youth 
migration. This is partly due to the challenges of attribution discussed earlier and the lack of detailed and 
reliable data on international migration, particularly from developing countries. The limited evidence on 
the link between international migration and climate change is often based on the analysis of macro-
level cross-country data that exploits the information available from developed countries as receiving 
nations. These studies often use temperature and precipitation to assess the correlation between 
variations in these environmental factors and migration flow. Cai et al. (2016) used 30 years of bilateral 
international migration datasets for 163 origin countries and 42 destination countries. They tested the 
hypothesis that climate change affects international migration through its effect on agricultural 
livelihoods. They estimated a country-pair fixed-effects regression model that links origin country 
weather variations to its international out-migration. Interaction terms between weather and 
agricultural dependence are included in the model to assess the agricultural link. The study found a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between temperature and international out-migration. 
Supporting their hypothesis, the results show that this relationship holds for agriculture-dependent 
countries. The study also shows that extreme heat and heat stress are correlated with both lower crop 
yields and higher flows of out-migration. The GDP of agriculture-dependent countries are also more 
negatively affected by higher temperature than non-agriculture-dependent countries (Cai et al. 2016). 
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Another study, by Backhaus et al. (2015), also found a similar, positive association between temperature 
and migration. In this study, Backhaus et al. (2015) applied a gravity model on panel migration data from 
142 migrant sending countries for the period 1995 to 2006. They found a positive correlation between 
temperature and migration, and similar to the study by Cai et al. (2016), the Backhaus et al. study also 
shows that the positive correlation between migration and temperature holds for agriculture-dependent 
countries. There are more studies that demonstrate similar, positive correlations between temperature 
and international migration based on cross-country studies (Afifi and Warner 2008, Naudé 2009). There 
are, however, very few studies that explore the linkages between environmental change and 
international migration based on time-series or panel data at a national level. Two studies on Mexico – 
US migration show that a decrease in precipitation is significantly associated with US-bound migration, 
especially for dry Mexican states (Feng et al. 2010, Nawrotzki et al. 2013). Feng et al. (2010) went further 
to provide an estimate of the number of future migrants due to climate change. The study reported that, 
at a higher global warming scenario, more than six million adult Mexicans will emigrate by the end of the 
century as a result of agricultural productivity declines alone, with most of these migrants likely to be 
younger and productive members of the Mexican population. 
To summarize, the research exploring the link between climate change and international migration 
found that changes in temperature and precipitation are closely correlated with migration flow. While 
there is some variation in the findings, the research is consistent in showing a stronger impact of climate 
change on agriculture-dependent countries and communities. There is, however, a lack of research 
analyzing the relationship between climate change and international migration for Africa and none 










The age and gender dimension of climate-induced migration 
In 2017, there were 258 million people in the world residing in a country outside of their country of birth 
(UNDESA 2017a). Youth are overrepresented in migration relative to their share in the total population. 
For instance, the estimated number of young migrants (aged 15 to 24) rose from approximately 22 
million in 1990 to 31 million in 2019. In 2019, young migrants accounted for 11.4 percent of the total 
migrant population but only 5.1 percent of the total population of all ages (UNDESA 2019). Globally, 
there is more youth migration from and within Africa. The number of emigrants between 15-30 years of 
age accounts for a quarter of the international migrant stock and one-third of international migrants in 
Africa. When expanding the age group to include those between the ages of 10-34 years old, the share of 
adolescent and youth migrants in Africa increases to 51 percent (UNDESA 2017b). 
Men are slightly more likely to migrate than women. In 2017, women accounted for 48.4 percent of all 
international migrants worldwide and 46.8 percent of international migrants in Africa (UNDESA 2017a). 
While there is a dearth of literature on the specific implications of climate change on international 
migration for youth and women, evidence from related literature suggests that the youth and women 
may be affected differently. In the next two sub-sections, we highlight some of the issues relevant for 
female and youth international migration as it relates to climate change. 
Climate change and international youth migration 
Although the youth may not have a higher level of exposure to 
climate change compared to other sections of society, lessons 
from labor migration research suggest that the youth, often in 
the age group of 15-30, are more likely to migrate in search of 
better livelihood (Lipton 1980, De Haan 1999, Castles et al. 2013). As discussed above, climate change is 
likely to compromise the livelihoods of youth in agriculture-dependent countries. Climate-induced 
environmental change is going to reduce both the quality and quantity of land available for farming, 
resulting in fewer livelihood sources for aspiring young farmers and other youth joining the agricultural 
labor market. Since youth are often unencumbered by family and social responsibilities, they are more 
likely than other members of the community to migrate in search of better livelihoods. The younger 
population, including those in eastern Africa, generally have better information and education when 
compared to previous generations, increasing the likelihood of climate-driven international migration 
from the continent. 
Young people are more 
likely to migrate in search of 
a better livelihood. 
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Climate change and female migration 
Climate change is expected to have a disproportionate impact 
on women in developing countries due to their culturally 
assigned roles, social positions, limited control over resources 
and other socio-economic vulnerabilities (Arora-Jonsson 2011, 
Eastin 2018). For example, a decline in the availability of water 
due to climate change is expected to increase the amount of time and effort women spend in collecting 
drinking water for the family. It is not obvious, however, whether women are more or less likely to 
migrate due to climate change. Women and men differ both in the pressure they experience from 
climate change and in terms of their adaptive and outmigration capacities. On the one hand, a reduction 
in the availability of suitable agricultural land and other environmental resources reduces women’s 
absolute and relative access to economic resources, even more than before, increasing their incentives 
to migrate. On the other hand, the cultural constraints on women’s mobility, their lack of information 
and resources for international migration and their socio-cultural obligation to less mobile members of 
the family will make women less able to out-migrate.  
Women may also be differently affected by the migration experience itself (Cannon 2002, Chindarkar 
2012, Antman 2013, Zhang 2018). Since women in developing countries often have fewer skills and less 
education, migrant women are less likely to secure formal sector employment compared to migrant 
men. When migrating as a family, the nutritional status of poor women may deteriorate further as they 
prioritize their children and men of the household (Cannon 2002). In the cases where the rural 
household responds to environmental stress by sending out male members of the household to urban 
areas or abroad, the women who stay behind experience a significant increase in workload in the short 
run as they are forced to cover the household chores, child rearing and farm activities. Women, 
particularly single women, are also more likely to be exposed to trafficking and sexual abuse during 




“Climate change is expected 
to have a disproportionate 




Trend and forecast of droughts over East Africa  
Modeling droughts in eastern Africa 
The livelihood of populations in many parts of Africa is 
strongly tied to subsistence and rain-fed agriculture. 
Climate extremes, such as frequent droughts and water 
stress, account for widespread food insecurity and failures 
in several key sectors (e.g. agriculture, energy, water 
resource management) that contribute to the regional economy. For instance, the 1974-1975 drought in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) caused 325,000 deaths in the Sahel, while the 1984-1985 drought in SSA led to 
450,000 deaths in Ethiopia and Sudan alone (Guha-Sapir et al. 2004). Hence, improved understanding, 
proper assessments and predictions of extreme climate events in the context of climate change are of 
paramount importance. As a result, several observational and modelling studies have been conducted 
over different regions of the globe to document the characteristics of extreme events, such as drought in 
current climate conditions and to assess the impact of global warming on future drought occurrences, 
severity, duration and patterns (Ntale and Gan 2003, Blenkinsop and Fowler 2007, Sheffield and Wood 
2008, Liu et al. 2012, Sienz et al. 2012, Zeleke et al. 2017). However, there are limited detailed climate 
modeling studies using high-resolution regional climate models in East Africa. The few existing studies 
are either on current conditions (Viste et al. 2013, Zeleke et al. 2017) or employ coarser resolution global 
climate models (Gizaw and Gan 2017). 
Although global climate models are based on well-established physical principles and have been 
demonstrated to reproduce several aspects of observed large-scale climate features, they need proper 
evaluation to assess climate change at regional and local scales. This is because global models have a 
limited capacity to simulate key processes which are relevant for the generation of regional extreme 
events due to their coarse resolution, missing processes or parameterization of sub-grid scale processes 
(Brasseur et al. 2017). It is also important to understand the role of local to regional scale processes, such 
as land-atmosphere interactions, orographically enhanced precipitation, and convective storms, in 
modulating the intensity and evolution of regional extreme events. Such meso-scale processes are better 
represented and simulated by high resolution regional climate models. In fact, numerous studies (e.g. 
Jung et al. 2012) have been carried out to assess the level of performance of high-resolution regional 
climate models, demonstrating that, while large-scale mean climate features are reasonably simulated 
by coarser resolution models, fine-scale resolution regional models are better in simulating convective 
“East Africa has recently suffered 
from repeated drought, floods 




events, surface induced precipitation or diurnal cycles of precipitation. Wehner et al. (2010), for 
instance, highlighted how the increase in model resolution led to improved simulations of extreme 
precipitation over land using such an approach. It must be clearly noted that observed extremes, as well 
as the trend in extremes in the current climate, are not well simulated by a typical coarse resolution 
global climate model (Kharin et al. 2007). 
One of the objectives of this section is, therefore, to characterize the drought patterns and the frequency 
of extreme dry days in the current climate using observations and high-resolution regional climate model 
simulations to avoid the aforementioned shortcomings of coarse-resolution global climate models. We 
are also interested in investigating the characteristics of these extreme climate events, such as droughts, 
and how they are projected to change by analyzing the current and future climate simulations under the 
realistic worst-case scenario for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions using the Representative Concentration 
Pathway (RCP) 8.5 for East Africa. This section is focused on producing climate modelling data for the 
region that highlight past and future trends in extreme events that are directly relevant for agriculture. 
The relation between occurrence of extreme events in each country and its impact on migration will be 















Domain, data, model and method 
Domain, observation data and model simulation 
Domain: The study area considered covers the eastern part of Africa, often called the Greater Horn of 
Africa (GHoA), ranging between 200S to 200N as shown in Figure 1. This includes Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The region includes a complex topography with 
elevation ranging from 200 meters (m) below sea level in Ethiopia’s Afar Depression to 5895 m above sea 
level at the top of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania. It is also considered drought prone as a significant 
portion of the area is semi-arid, in addition to the erratic nature of rainfall amount, distribution and 
pattern in the region. The rainy season varies considerably across the region due to the movement of the 
Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and the underlying complex topography of the region. As a 
result, the northwestern part of the domain, including western Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, receives 
rainfall from June to September, whereas countries in the equatorial and southern part of the domain 
receive rainfall mainly in the spring, from March to May, and autumn, from October to December. Other 
parts of the region, such as northeast Ethiopia, receive rain during the spring and summer seasons 
(Segele and Lamb 2005). 
Observation Data: High resolution data for daily precipitation observations over the GHoA was obtained 
from the climate hazards infrared precipitation station (CHIRPS) (Funk et al. 2015). CHIRPS is constructed 
by merging local station data and infrared satellite estimated precipitation, making it an attractive option 
for data sparse regions, such as the GHoA. Although the data is available at higher resolution and for a 
longer period, the sub-set data used here covers the time period from 1983 to 2016 and is interpolated 
onto a 0.250 grid resolution. 
Model simulations: In this study, we also used simulated precipitation data for current (1983-2005) and 
future (2077-2099) periods and scenario analyses at a spatial resolution of 0.24 degrees, using the 
International Centre for Theoretical Physics’ (ICTP) regional climate model (RegCM4) (Giorgi et al. 2012) 
driven by two of the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5) global models, 
namely the Hadley Centre Global Environment Model Version 2 (HadGEM2) and a European Community 
Earth-System Model (EC-EARTH). 
Method: Quantifying regional climate extremes in East Africa 
Several indices have been devised to quantify climate extremes, particularly for droughts (Dai 2011). 
These indices range from those that consider only precipitation, to more complex methods that consider 
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a water balance approach using precipitation, evapotranspiration and antecedent soil moisture. In this 
study, we utilize two different meteorological indices from the first category (i.e. using only precipitation 
dataset) to characterize historical and future droughts over East Africa. The first one is the number of dry 
days, which can be computed annually or for a specific growing season as it reflects the overall condition 
of extreme climate conditions for rain-fed agriculture. We define a dry day when the cumulative daily 
precipitation values are less than 1mm. The frequency of dry days is computed on an annual basis. These 
analyses can indicate if the frequency of dry days within the growing season is substantially different 
from year-round frequencies in the region.  
The second index is the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) (McKee et al. 1993), recommended by the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to characterize long-term meteorological droughts around 
the world (Hayes et al., 2011). This is a relatively simple index based on precipitation data alone to 
measure the precipitation deficit (drought) or excess rainfall (flood) (Seiler et al. 2002). To compute the 
SPI, monthly time series of precipitation are fitted to a gamma distribution. SPI values are estimated as a 
transformation of the cumulative probability to a standard normal value with a zero mean and a variance 
of one. SPI can, therefore, be considered a measure of standardized departure from the empirical rainfall 
probability distribution function. Various thresholds have been suggested to identify drought (McKee et 
al. 1995, Komuscu 1999, Agnew 2000). According to McKee et al. (1995), an SPI value of less than -2 
indicates an extreme drought, whereas a value of less than -1 (between -2 and -1) indicates a moderate 
drought. Even though the SPI relies solely on monthly precipitation values, it has performed well over 
the eastern African region as demonstrated by Ntale and Gan (2003). Another advantage of SPI is that it 
can be calculated over different time scales to allow for the interpretation of drought from a monthly to 
multiyear scale. In this study, year-long drought (SPI12) is computed at a spatial scale of one degree to 
represent long-term meteorological drought patterns in East Africa. We will focus on the occurrence of 
drought, defined as the total number of drought events below -1.5 (i.e. for severe and extremes ones) in 








Drought in eastern Africa: Modeling results 
Present-day climate patterns 
The number of dry days is important for the estimation of 
meteorological drought. Figure 1 shows the climatological 
mean number of dry day frequency for annual (a) and 
summer (b) seasons for the 1983-2005 period. For the 
GHoA region, dry-day occurrences seem to be affected by 
the elevation in both the annual and summer seasons. 
The climatological dry-day frequency exhibits a 
remarkable spatial pattern with high values over lowlands 
(e.g. Somalia, Djibouti northern Kenya and south-eastern Ethiopia) and lower values over central (e.g. 
Congo) and eastern Africa (e.g. Ethiopian) highlands (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Frequency of annual (a) and summer (b) dry days from CHIRPS dataset. 
The Global Circulation Model (GCM), driven by the RegCM4 simulation, reproduced the overall spatial 
patterns of the observed dry-day frequency both on an annual basis and during the summer season 
(Figure 2). As expected, the regional model simulations show few numbers of dry days over 
climatologically wet regions and a high number of dry days over semi-arid and desert regions. The high-
“Quantitative analysis shows that 
international migration in eastern 
Africa is correlated with drought. 
For every single day increase of 
annual dry days in a country, 
3,400 emigrants can be expected 
from that country.” 
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resolution simulations show that the spatial pattern and magnitude of precipitation extremes are much 
closer to the observed values as noted in other studies (e.g. Wehner et al. 2010).  
 
Figure 2. Simulated climatology of annual (left) and summer (right) number of dry days from RegCM- HadGEM2 
(top row) and RegCM4-ECEARTH (second row). 
It should be noted that minor biases are unavoidable, even in regional model simulations, despite the 
significant improvements in capturing the local and regional spatial scale events. For example, RegCM4 
simulations show an overestimation of annual dry days over northeast Ethiopia. It must also be noted 
that extreme precipitation estimates from observational data are only reliable for regions with dense 
station networks like those near cities and densely populated areas.  
Figure 3 shows the occurrence of severe to extreme droughts based on the definition of SPI using 
observational and present-day simulation data. Results based on the CHIRPS precipitation data suggest 
that severe and extreme droughts frequently occur over central Tanzania, regions bordering Sudan and 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and northern Somalia. It is important to note that SPI is a normalized index and, hence, 
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the frequency of drought is not influenced by the level of aridity of the region. Analysis of the simulated 
drought generally suggests the models reproduced some aspects of the observed drought pattern. In 
particular, the regional model simulations are able to reproduce the prevalence of drought occurrences 
over northern Somalia, southern Ethiopia and Tanzania as demonstrated in Figure 4. There are, however, 
important differences between the observed and simulated drought patterns. For instance, the 
frequency of severe to extreme droughts over Tanzania and the region near the border of Sudan and 
Eritrea may have been underestimated to a limited extent. 
 
Figure 3. Occurrence of severe to extreme drought (number of months for which SPI12 < −1.5), observation data 
        
Figure 4. Occurrence of severe to extreme drought (number of months for which SPI12 < −1.5) from regional 




This study also investigates how droughts are projected to change under future climate scenarios. The 
spatial distribution of the projected changes in the climatological mean of the dry-day frequency in 
future climate is displayed in Figure 5. Both simulations (Figure 5a and Figure 5b) consistently project an 
increase in the frequency of growing-season dry-days throughout the regions where summer is the main 
rainy season under the RCP 8.5. The increase in the EC-EARTH driven RegCM4 simulation (Figure 5b) is, 
however, not uniform across the region or the national and sub-national level. For example, the 
simulation shows less impact over the main parts of the Ethiopian highlands but indicates an increasing 
intensity along the peripheries within Ethiopia. Since the region is already experiencing food insecurity 
under the current climate, the projected increase in dry days suggests the potential for higher, future 
vulnerabilities in this region due to further climate warming. 
 
Figure 5: Projected changes in frequency of dry days in the late 21st century (2077-2099) relative to current 
(1983-2005) from RegCM-HadGEM (left, Fig. 5a) and RegCM4-ECEARTH (right, Fig. 5b) simulations. 
The spatial pattern of the change in the occurrence of severe to extreme drought episodes in the late 
21st century is given in Figure 6. Unlike the number of dry days, which measures short-term droughts, the 
frequency of long-term extreme droughts, measured by SPI12, does not show a significant increase in 
droughts in the future, even though this measure is increasing and still poses a substantial threat to the 
region’s agricultural productivity and livelihoods. This implies that climate change is expected to affect 
the frequency of droughts differently over different regions within East Africa.  
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Figure 6. Change of SPI12 drought occurrence in the late 21st century (2077-2099) relative to current (1983- 
2005) from RegCM-HadGEM (left, Figure 6a) and RegCM4-ECEARTH (right, Figure 6b) simulations. 
The results also show that the pattern of change is different in the two simulations (Figure 6a and Figure 
6b) due to the difference in the driving data, even though the two simulations are derived from the same 
regional climate model. For instance, the projections from the HadGEM2-driven (Figure 6a) regional 
model show a decrease in the frequency of long-term drought over Somalia and southern Ethiopia and 
an increase in drought prevalence over central Tanzania. The EC-EARTH-driven simulation (Figure 6b), on 
the other hand, projected an increase in drought frequency over much of Tanzania and northern 
Ethiopia. The decrease in the frequency of severe to extreme droughts in HadGEM2-driven simulations, 
over Somalia and southern Ethiopia, is correlated with the increase in annual precipitation in many IPCC 
CMIP5 models. This relationship suggests that the decrease in drought occurrence is the result of fewer, 
but more intense, precipitation events rather than the outcome of a higher number of rainy days 
distributed across the year or growing season, which is more desirable for agriculture. Another 
interesting point about this region is that the current climate models project a decrease in drought 
frequency in the late 21st century, despite the upward trend of droughts in present day climate as shown 
in Viste et al. (2013) and Zeleke et al. (2017). Consequently, reconciling the present-day drying trend with 
the projected increase in intense precipitation is becoming an active area of research (Rowell et al. 
2015). 
To summarize, our analysis reveals that high-resolution models simulate the extreme events reasonably 
well, particularly the pattern of dry days over eastern African highlands. Two drought indicators, SPI12 
and the frequency of dry days, are computed and compared for current and future climates. Projections 
based on the number of dry days indicated that 21st century droughts in the eastern parts of Africa will 
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tend to be longer and more frequent than those associated with the present climate. Another important 
result involves the prominent differences between the two indices for future drought projections, with 
the former indicating a drastic increase compared to the latter.  
This study has focused on rainfall derived drought characteristics (e.g. SPI). Future work should also 
include the development of drought indices, such as Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) and 
Standardized Precipitation-Evaporation Index (SPEI), that consider temperature and other atmospheric 
variables to determine robust drought statistics under climate change conditions. This analysis can be 
considered the first step towards quantifying and understanding eastern Africa’s drought characteristics 
in current and future climates as determined from observations and high-resolution climate model 
simulations. It must be noted that there are several sources of uncertainties when projecting future 
droughts such as those related to model formulations and emission scenarios. Therefore, a 
comprehensive assessment of climate extremes, such as droughts, needs to be considered using multi-














International migration in East Africa 
Magnitude and trend 
International migration in Africa has steadily increased over the past few decades. In 2017, 38 million 
Africans were living outside of their country of origin, the majority of whom (65 percent) were residing in 
another African country (IOM 2018). According to the UNDESA database, in 2017, emigrant stock from 
Africa are estimated to have accounted for around 15 percent of total international migrants in the 
world. Figure 7 shows migration trends in Africa (UNDESA 2017a). The number of emigrants found in 
Africa stagnated for a long period of time, increasing only in recent years. 
 
Figure 7: Trends of international emigrant stock found globally and in Africa. Source: Own computation based on 
UNDESA database, 2017a.  
Like most of Africa, the eastern region has experienced significant, increasing international migration 
trends. Table 2 shows international migration from East African countries included in this study (i.e. 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda). Total international 
emigrant stock from the region almost doubled in the last two decades, from around 4.6 million in 1990 
to 8.7 million in 2017. As seen in Figure 8, this is closely and positively correlated with the rapid growth 
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of the youth population in the region. It is essential to note, however, that the emigrant stock reported 
here captures only documented emigrants. Consequently, the total number of international emigrants 
who have left the region is likely to be even larger than what is reported here. In fact, various studies 
note (Shaw 2007, Marchand et al. 2017), many African migrants migrate through irregular or alternative 
routes and are often not recorded in official statistics. 
Table 2. Trends of emigrant stock from sample countries from 1990 to 2017. 
Country of origin 
Total number of stock of emigrants by year 




 Eritrea  170,617 325,272 510,432 289,183 278,086 607,917 9.50% 
 Ethiopia  1,687,517 820,490 443,926 521,088 623,562 800,879 -2.00% 
 Kenya  242,119 267,084 308,199 344,121 407,446 501,204 4.00% 
 Somalia  846,967 899,478 1,004,443 1,150,483 1,578,233 1,988,458 5.00% 
 South Sudan  514,943 438,044 342,628 243,075 403,896 1,752,014 9.00% 
 Sudan  587,063 745,992 859,690 1,175,018 1,197,225 1,951,705 9.00% 
 Tanzania  204,272 232,062 220,108 238,881 267,834 324,394 2.00% 
 Uganda  311,490 469,323 552,835 557,486 702,606 739,667 5.00% 
Total 4,564,988 4,197,745 4,242,261 4,519,335 5,458,888 8,666,238 3.00% 
Source: UNDESA, 2017a. 
A closer inspection of the data on emigrant stock originating from each sample country shows that the 
size of international migration from eastern Africa has varied over time and across countries in the sub-
region. In terms of absolute size, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan had, by far, the largest number of 
international emigrants in 2017, while in the 1990s, Ethiopia had the largest number of emigrants.  
Table 3 reports the intensity of emigration for each of the case study countries. Intensity is given by the 
stock of emigrants as a share of total population in the source country. Tanzania consistently recorded 
the lowest emigration rates, with less than one percent (0.6-0.8 percent) of the population living abroad 
in the reporting period. Kenya has a slightly higher, constant emigration rate at one percent. Somalia has 
the highest emigration rate, with more than 10 percent of the population living outside of the country in 
all reporting periods. For other countries, the emigration rate fluctuates over time, often following 




Figure 8: Trends of international emigrant stocks and emigrant intensity from and total youth population in study 
countries. Source: UNDESA (2017a, 2017b) and UN Population Statistics.  
 
Table 3: Intensity of emigrant stock from the case study countries (per 100 people in origin country). 
Country 
Stock of migrants as a share of population size in the country of origin 
1990 2000 2010 2017 
Eritrea 5.5 15.0 6.3 12.0 
Ethiopia 3.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Kenya 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Somalia 11.4 11.1 13.1 13.5 
South Sudan 8.9 5.1 4.0 13.9 
Sudan 2.9 3.2 3.5 4.8 
Tanzania 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Uganda 1.8 2.3 2.1 1.7 
Total 3.0 2.1 2.0 2.6 
Source: Own computation based on UNDESA (2017a, 2017c).  
While most international migrants from the case study countries live within Africa, there is also 
significant migration to Europe, North America, the Middle East and other regions of the world. Table 4 
presents the share of East African emigrants who live outside of Africa. In 1990, only two out of 10 
international migrants from the case study countries emigrated to a non-African country. In the following 
34 
 
two decades, however, the share of emigrants from eastern Africa who lived outside Africa steadily 
increased, peaking in 2010 at about 44 percent. The most recent data from 2015 and 2017 show this 
share is declining (UNDESA 2017a).  
Table 4. Destinations of emigrants from the sample countries: Percent share located outside Africa 
  
Country of origin 
Share of emigrants located outside of Africa 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Eritrea 20.1 15.6 13.0 30.5 46.2 30.4 30.7 
Ethiopia 14.1 31.0 64.1 72.4 80.3 80.7 80.3 
Kenya 67.2 70.3 70.2 73.3 74.2 74.3 71.5 
Somalia 12.8 21.2 25.8 31.2 36.7 36.3 36.4 
South Sudan 1.1 1.6 2.5 4.0 4.5 1.7 1.4 
Sudan 49.8 43.8 43.1 39.4 54.0 40.1 42.1 
Uganda 23.5 16.9 15.7 17.9 17.1 18.5 19.2 
Tanzania 29.9 28.7 33.1 35.2 37.9 41.2 40.6 
Total 21.4 27.7 32.2 38.3 43.9 35.6 35.0 















The effect of climate change on East African migration 
Projected effects on overall migration in the region: Literature 
The eastern Africa region has recently suffered from 
repeated drought, floods and other disasters, resulting in 
significant displacement. In 2016, the region had the highest 
number of displacements in all of Africa, accounting for 63 
percent of the continent’s displacement associated with sudden-onset disasters (IDMC 2017). With the 
changing climate, it is expected that the region will see more displacement and climate induced migrants 
in the coming years, with estimates placing the number of climate migrants in eastern Africa as high as 
10.1 million by 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018). Eastern Africa is expected to be both a hotspot for in-migration 
(receiving migrants) and out-migration (sending migrants), due to the effects of climate change. The 
most recent climate and population model projections suggest that the Lake Victoria Basin in the GHoA 
and the eastern highlands of Ethiopia are expected to be hotspots for in-migration, while coastal regions 
of Kenya and Tanzania, western Uganda and parts of the northern highlands of Ethiopia will become 













“In 2016, East Africa had the 
highest number of 
displacements in all of Africa.” 
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Empirical analysis for the sample countries: Correlation 
between climate variables and international migration in East 
Africa 
 
Below we discuss the empirical relationship between climate variables and international migration from 
East Africa. The analysis is based on migration data from UNDESA and climate data produced by our own 
climate modelling. Figure 8 shows the scatter plot and fitted, non-parametric regression between the 
drought indicator (annual dry days) and international emigration. The vertical axis shows the number of 
international emigrants from the study country, reported as a stock of emigrants in that year, and the 
horizontal axis shows the average number of annual dry days for the source country. We believe that the 
effect of drought in a particular year on the stock of emigrants is observed with a lag, and that 
insufficient rain in one year may not be enough to trigger migration. Hence the dry days in the horizontal 
axis show the average for the previous five years. 
The plot shows that there is a positive correlation between the number of dry days the country 
experienced in the last five years and the number of international migrants from that country. The 
relationship is non-linear, with the effect of dry days increasing at higher levels.  
 
Figure 9: Correlation between annual dry days the country experiences in the previous five years and stock of 
emigrants from that country. 
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We also conducted a simple regression analysis where the number of dry days is regressed over the 
stock of emigrants. We controlled for trend by including a year variable. We also included agriculture’s 
share of employment as an additional regressor, as the relative size of agriculture may have implications 
for emigration from these countries. Table 5 reports the results from the linear regression. Before 
discussing the results, we want to highlight that, given the data limitations discussed in Section 2,1 we 
will only identify correlations and will not claim any causal relationship.  
Table 5. Impact of drought on international migration (linear regression analysis for Eastern Africa). 
  Stock of emigrants (‘000) 
  Coefficient Std. Err. P-value 
Annual number of dry days in the previous 5 years 3.385 1.539 0.033 
Size of agriculture in the economy (as share of 
employment) 1.251 4.894 0.799 
Year (trend) 15.722 7.232 0.035 
Constant -31896 14539 0.034 






Source: Own computation  
In line with the non-parametric regression, we see that the number of dry days a country experienced in 
the past five years is positively correlated with the number of international emigrant stock from that 
country. More specifically, a one day increase in the number of annual dry days in a country is associated 
with approximately 3,400 more emigrant stock from that country. This relationship is significant at the 5 
percent level. The size of agriculture in the economy is also positively correlated with the magnitude of 
emigrant stock, but it is not statistically significant. We see a strong, positive trend of emigration from 
the case study countries. More particularly, emigrant stock from these countries increases by almost 
16,000 every five years.  
Given the small sample size, we are reluctant to claim causality or emphasize the size of the effect. 
Despite the limitations, however, the overall results are in line with the results from previous empirical 
studies based on micro-level data. For example, earlier studies in Ethiopia and Tanzania show that 
migration is one of the most common responses for environmental-related shocks, such as drought 
(Gray and Mueller 2012, Kubik and Maurel 2016). The Tanzanian study shows that a one percent 
reduction in agricultural income, induced by short-term weather shocks, increases the probability of 
 
1 We have only eight countries for which emigration data is available from 1990 to 2015, at five years interval. 
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migration, on average, by 13 percent within the following year (Kubik and Maurel 2016). Similarly, a 
longitudinal study on population mobility and drought in Ethiopia shows that men’s labor migration 
increases with drought and that land-poor households are the most vulnerable (Gray and Mueller 2012), 






















New pressures on old challenges: Climate change effects on 
youth migration 
In 2017, about 31 percent of international migrants were 
young people between the ages of 15 and 34 (UNDESA 
2017a). Female youth accounted for nearly 47 percent of the 
total youth international migrants in the same year. This figure is based on age-disaggregated data 
available from receiving countries. Unfortunately, published quantitative data on youth international 
migration from Africa, as well as from other developing regions, is not available to directly examine the 
magnitude and trends of youth migration from the case study countries.  
Africa has the youngest population in the world, with 60 percent below 25 years of age (UNDESA 2017c). 
Currently, there is a large youth population joining the labor market in both urban and rural areas, often 
with more education than previous generations. African economies, including those in eastern African 
countries, need to rapidly create a large number of jobs to meet the livelihood needs of the new labor 
force. However, as these are predominantly agricultural economies, it is increasingly difficult to create 
jobs that are suitable and attractive enough for the youth, resulting in large rural-urban migration (Bezu 
and Holden 2014, Fox et al. 2016). This is likely to get worse and generate more international migration 
unless the sector is significatlly transformed with a higher number of jobs that are innovative and which 
attract young people. These structural economic problems are exacerbated by the pressure from climate 
change as the environmental and agroecological changes result in lower crop productivity, more land 
scarcity and higher risks of extreme weather events (Rigaud et al. 2018). Data from case study countries 
in SSA show that 60 percent of internal migrants are between the age of 15 and 34 years old 
(Mercandalli and Losch 2017).  
Within Africa, eastern Africa has been deemed a climate “hotspot,” or a place where a changing climate 
could pose grave threats to food security and human well-being (Woolf et al. 2018). The East African 
region is perhaps even more likely than the rest of the continent to experience a rapid increase in youth 
international migration. The share of the youth population in eastern Africa at 35 percent, is the highest 
in Africa (UNDESA 2017d). Since subsistence agriculture is the main source of livelihoods in this region, 
the youth are mostly engaged in agricultural activities. The region experienced repeated and significant 
weather- and climate-related shocks in recent years and is vulnerable to further climate change impacts. 
All of this suggests the possibility of significant, climate-induced migration in the coming years.  
“Eastern Africa has been 
deemed a climate “hotspot.”” 
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Adapting agriculture to climate change in eastern Africa 
Estimates by the World Bank (2010) indicate that 
developing countries bear around 70-80 percent of 
costs related to climate change damages. This is due to 
their heavy reliance on ecosystem services and natural 
capital for agricultural production, high exposure to 
climate variability and change, poverty and limited 
financial and institutional capacity to adapt to climate 
change (WB 2010). Increasing adaptation to climate 
change is crucial to minimize current and future negative impacts (WB 2010).  
According to the IPCC (2007), adaptation is an “adjustment to human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.” A 
growing body of empirical literature, however, documents that the decision to adapt to climate change 
depends on interacting environmental, social, political and economic factors, operating at multiple scales 
(Deryng et al. 2011, Rigaud et al. 2018, Clay and King 2019). Available literature also shows that 
populations living in developing countries generally use a wide range of strategies to adapt to climate 
variability, climate change and weather extremes (Zilberman et al. 2012). According to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), climate change is considered a significant threat-
multiplier to factors that cause youth migration, especially in agriculture-dependent populations and 
regions, such as eastern Africa (FAO 2017).  Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) and climate-smart 
adaptation strategies are useful mechanisms to reduce youth out-migration by creating local economic 
opportunities, encouraging youth to stay rather than abandon their agricultural lands.   
Climate-smart agriculture 
Since its launch by the FAO in 2009, CSA has increased in popularity at the international and national 
levels. CSA is an approach to transform agricultural systems and to support food security under a 
changing climate by providing context-specific and flexible solutions (Lipper et al. 2014). CSA practices 
can be heterogeneous over time and across locations and may encompass technological, institutional 
and policy solutions (Mirzabaev 2018). As described by the FAO (2013), a number of agricultural 
technologies and practices fall under CSA, including stress-adapted crop varieties and livestock breeds, 
improved seeds, crop diversification, conservation agriculture (e.g. reduced- or zero-tillage), water 
Developing countries will bear the 
brunt of climate damages. Climate-
smart agriculture, weather-index 
insurance, social safety-net 
programs and planned relocation 
can help agricultural systems and 




management (e.g. irrigation and water storage), agroforestry and integrated soil management practices 
(e.g. mulching and crop rotation). Previous studies in SSA demonstrate that the adoption of CSA 
technologies and practices has generated multiple benefits, including improved agricultural yields, food 
security and increased income in the context of climate change and variability (Makate 2019). Despite 
this, the adoption of effective CSA technologies and practices by smallholder farmers in Africa remains 
limited. Appropriate financial, policy and institutional arrangements are needed to scale-up existing CSA 
technologies and practices and to enable smallholder African farmers to benefit from them at scale 
(Makate 2019). In fact, the African Development Bank (AfDB) is committed to adapting to climate change 
through climate-smart financing of development, including agriculture (AFDB 2018), which could possibly 
minimize the forced out-migration of rural labor (FAO 2017).   
Weather-index insurance  
In addition to damaging the current asset-base of the population and inducing the displacement of both 
adults and youth, climate extremes will also reduce the confidence of people to invest in productive 
endeavors. In this regard, institutional innovations, such as weather-index insurance (WII), have received 
increased attention in the context of climate change adaptation (WB 2010). Previous empirical studies 
indicate that WII reduced weather-related, distress livestock sales in Kenya (Janzen and Carter 2013) and 
increased the adoption of improved farm technologies and practices in Ethiopia (Madajewicz et al. 2013), 
possibly reducing the need for out-migration as a risk management strategy.  
Social safety-net programs 
Social protection measures can be useful instruments to cope with weather shocks caused by climate 
change. Productive safety-net programs (PSNP), implemented by the Government of Ethiopia since 2005, 
are useful example for the case in point. By implementing climate-smart initiatives (CSI) within PSNP (WB 
2013, Solomon et al. 2016, Woolf et al. 2018) Ethiopia has been able to significantly cope with drought 
shocks while also building community-based infrastructure and natural capital (Berhane et al. 2014). A 
study by Deshingkar et al. (2013), based on household-level data from Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Malawi, shows that social protections tend to reduce the need for out-migration. However, the authors 
argue that this may not always be desirable as it could increase mal-adaptation, trapping people in 
unsustainable livelihood strategies in the context of deteriorating conditions. They recommend that 
apart from smoothing consumption, social protection policies should be designed to enable rural 
households to diversify their income sources, including through migrating. On the contrary, Woolf et al. 
(2018) used biophysical data, collected from Ethiopian regional states, with results indicating that 
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climate-smart PSNP can contribute to climate change mitigation by creating a vehicle for investment in 
land and ecosystem restoration. The authors highlighted that maximizing mitigation, while enhancing 
but not compromising the rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems and food security, requires effective 
climate scenario and vulnerability analysis and projections. Additionally, mitigation and adaptation 
responses should be mainstreamed into the overall planning and implementation of climate-smart PSNP 
at all levels and scales. 
Migration as a household adaptation strategy  
Migration can be an effective adaptation strategy in a changing climate (Warner et al. 2009, WB 2010, 
Zilberman et al. 2012, Baldwin 2013, IPCC 2014c, Millock 2015). In cases where climate migrants choose 
when and where to migrate, instead of being suddenly forced to migrate, migration often benefits the 
migrant, their family and the host community (Harttgen and Klasen 2011, Melde et al. 2017, UNDP 
2009). Evidence also suggests that remittances from migrants improve the adaptive capacity and 
recovery of households exposed to environmental shocks ( Mohapatra et al. 2009, Nganga et al. 2016, 
Banerjee et al. 2017).  
Meze-Hausken (2000) found that climate-induced migration from rural areas in northern Ethiopia has 
increased in the wake of severe droughts. Using data from Ethiopian rural household surveys, Gray and 
Mueller (2012) also find that self-reported drought increases the likelihood of domestic migration. In 
northern Kenya, Nganga et al. (2016) used data from agro-pastoral households to show that the out-
migration of a household member increases the adoption of climate change adaptation practices (e.g. 
purchasing of drought-tolerant livestock and other self-protection measures) by migrant-sending 
households. According to the authors, the main underlying mechanism linking migration to the adoption 
of adaptation practices is remittances received from the migrants, which reduced capital constraints to 
finance the uptake of adaptation measures. Not all households, however, are able to utilize migration as 
an adaptive strategy since migration, especially to distant places, is often an arduous, risky and 
expensive process. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that adverse environmental conditions also 
reduce long-distance mobility by depriving people of the necessary resources to finance the move 
(UNECA 2017). A recent study in Tanzania shows that migration is an important response to manage the 
loss of agricultural income caused by climate variability and weather shocks among households in the 
middle-wealth category (Kubik and Maurel, 2016). The main reason for this is that the poorest 
households cannot afford migration costs while households that are more well-off financially can apply 
other adaptation strategies, like irrigation or drought-resistant crops (Kubik and Maurel 2016). 
43 
 
Planned relocation or resettlement 
In cases where the damage from climate variability and change on the natural environment and 
associated ecosystem services is such that the landscape is unable to support the existing population, it 
is important to plan for relocation and resettlement. Ignoring and delaying policy responses in such cases 
may result in unmanageable, large-scale migration, resulting in humanitarian, logistical and political crisis 
(Foresight 2011). Moreover, the most vulnerable group may be trapped in uninhabitable places, 
becoming even more impoverished and threatened with irrevocable damage to their health. Planned 
relocation or resettlement of people from areas vulnerable to climate or weather extremes is, thus, an 
important climate adaptation strategy (Raleigh et al. 2008, Foresight 2011, Rigaud et al. 2018). Migration 
in this climate-induced system can be voluntary or incentivized to motivate people to move from areas 
exposed to climate hazards to safe environments within or outside a given country. Typically, such 
measures are planned and executed by governments, perhaps in conjunction with civil societies and 
human rights groups. However, it is important to note here that government induced resettlement in 
developing countries has not been popular in the past and experienced various degrees of failure (Black 
et al. 2008). For example, following severe droughts in Ethiopia between 1984-85, the government 
resettled about 600,000 people from drought-affected central and northern Ethiopia to southwest 
Ethiopia, where the land is more fertile and favorable for sustainable agriculture (Rahmato 1989). This 
program was highly contested and faced several challenges at the time (Ezra and Kiros 2001, Black et al. 
2008). In 2003, a new voluntary resettlement program was again initiated by the government as part of 
its national food security strategy. Although hailed by the Ethiopian government and some scholars as a 
success (Kassa 2004,  Lemenih et al. 2014), the renewed resettlement program has been criticized for 
inadequate planning and resourcing, marginalizing the poorest of the poor and blocking access of non-
governmental organizations, civil society and other independent observers from the resettlement 
schemes (Hammond and Dessalegn 2004, Hammond 2008). It is imperative to learn from past mistakes 
to design a forward-thinking resettlement plan. A reactive relocation in an emergency is a sign of 





Summary of findings 
This study assessed the link between climate change, agriculture and international migration. We 
provided a conceptual framework that shows the link between climate change and migration through its 
effect on agricultural livelihoods. The study focuses on eight eastern African countries, including Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, and explores the climate change-
agriculture-international migration nexus from the youth perspective. Below we highlight the main 
findings of this study: 
1. Existing empirical evidence suggests that climate change is associated with increased migration 
Climate change is expected to trigger unprecedent levels of migration in the coming decades, including 
from eastern Africa. Existing empirical literature shows that:  
• Temperature and precipitation are closely correlated with migration flow.  
• The impact of climate change on international migration is stronger for agricultural countries and 
communities. 
• Migration incident is higher among the youth population.  
• Although women in developing countries are expected to experience more pressure to migrate, 
they are not necessarily more likely to migrate due to fewer resources, cultural constraints 
regarding their mobility, and stronger responsibilities towards less mobile members of the 
household.  
2. Climate change trends and projections in East Africa 
• The East Africa region has recently suffered from repeated drought, floods and other disasters 
that result in significant out-migration. 
• Results from our climate model show that the East African region will experience longer and 
more frequent droughts than those associated with the present climate. 
• Agricultural livelihoods in East Africa will be more vulnerable in the coming decades, potentially 
leading to additional, significant local and international outmigration. 
3. Migration trends in East Africa 




• 63 percent of the continent’s displacement associated with or triggered by sudden-onset 
disasters is accounted for by East African countries.  
• Migration from eastern Africa almost doubled in the past two decades, with the stock of 
international emigrants from the region increasing from 4.6 million in 1990 to 8.7 million in 
2017. This figure does not include irregular migrants. 
• Most eastern African migrants live within Africa; however, recent trends show an increase in the 
share of emigrants living outside of Africa including the Middle East, Europe, Australia and North 
America. 
• There is significant difference among eastern African countries in terms of intensity of 
emigration. Less than one percent of Tanzanians live outside of their country while for Somalia, 
that share is at 10 percent. For the region, the rate is two to three percent in the period 1990 to 
2017. 
4. The impact of climate change on international migration in eastern Africa 
• Quantitative analysis shows that international migration in eastern Africa is correlated with 
drought. 
• A higher number of average dry days for a country is positively correlated with a higher stock of 
emigrants from that country. 
• An increase in the number of annual dry days is associated with increased emigration. For every 
one day increase of annual dry days in a country, 3,400 emigrants can be expected from that 
country. 
• Given the significance of agriculture as a livelihood source, the positive correlation between 
climate change indicator dry days and emigration is not unexpected, in line with other findings in 
the literature. However, given the limited sample size in our data, this result needs to be 
interpreted with caution.  
5. The prospect of youth international migration from East Africa is high and increasing with climate 
change  
• Africa has the youngest population in the world, with 65 percent of the population below 25 
years. 
• The share of the youth population in eastern Africa is 35 percent, making it the highest in Africa. 
• The eastern African region is poised to experience significant youth migration in the coming 
decades due to direct and indirect impacts of climate change on livelihoods. 
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•  The youth in eastern Africa are more likely to be unemployed, less encumbered with family 
responsibilities and have more education than previous generations. All of these increase the 
likelihood of youth migration in the context of climate change. 
• Age-disaggregated statistics on emigration from East Africa are not readily available and there 
are few studies on international migration from Africa. Existing, indirect evidence, however, 
suggests there is higher migration among the youth in Africa.  
• For example, statistics from case study countries show that 60 percent of internal migrants are 
between the ages of 15 and 34.  
6. There are various potential adaptation measures, but success depends on careful planning and 
policy coordination  
• CSA: Existing evidence from several SSA countries suggests that the adoption of CSA improves 
agricultural yields, food security, livelihoods and income in the context of climate change and 
variability. However, adoption of effective CSA technologies and practices by smallholder 
farmers in Africa remains limited.  
• Weather Index Insurance: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia and Kenya indicates that this 
adoption strategy is promising in terms of protecting assets and facilitating improved technology 
adoption, possibly reducing the forced out-migration of labor. The main concern with this 
strategy is that it is difficult to insure all affected when climate change affects a large group of 
people simultaneously. 
• Safety-net programs: Safety-net programs can be useful instruments to cope with weather 
shocks caused by climate change, such as droughts. There is some evidence from East Africa 
suggesting that such programs reduce out-migration. However, there have been concerns over 
the crowding effect of such programs on private and informal insurance. 
• Relocation and resettlement: Planned relocation or resettlement, from areas vulnerable to 
climate change, is an important climate adaptation strategy. However, due to the size and 
logistics needs, resettlement and relocation demand strong government involvement. 
Unfortunately, past government-led relocations in Africa have not been successful and any new 
relocation strategy needs careful assessment. 
• Migration as adaptation strategy: There is ample evidence in the literature, across different 
countries, showing that agricultural households’ resort to migration as a response to 
environmental shocks and as an income diversification strategy in the face of risk. Not all 
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individuals, however, are able to migrate as an adaptation strategy, but may be displaced 
without preparation after they exhaust their resources and capacity. Proactive migration as an 
adaptation strategy can increase the climate resilience of vulnerable rural populations 





























Our extensive review of research on climate change and migration identified key research gaps that need 
to be filled to craft informed policy and programs, including: 
Rigorous research on youth livelihoods and migration in Africa. Although there are many references to 
youth migration and suggestive evidence on the increased level of youth migration in Africa, we found 
limited research on patterns, drivers and impacts of youth migration. With climate change, we need 
more information about how people respond to environmental changes and how the responses change 
over time. We suggest exploring the possibility of conducting cross-country studies for East Africa using 
the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) survey, which has been implemented in 
several African countries. Such analysis could be supplemented with a more in-depth study based on 
survey data from one of the countries.   
More work to quantify East Africa’s drought characteristics in current and future climates. In this study, 
we provided a simple quantification of drought in East Africa using a regional model. It is noted that 
there are several sources of uncertainties when projecting future droughts, such as those related to 
model formulations and emission scenarios. Therefore, a comprehensive assessment of climate 
extremes, such as droughts, needs to be considered using multi-model simulations driven with multiple 
emission scenarios to capture the above ranges of uncertainties. Future work should also include the 
development of drought indices, such as PDSI and SPEI, that consider temperature and other 
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